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1Introduction
At Cisco Systems within the Information Technology (IT) division, there was a
need to improve the process by which user accounts were added, deleted or modified on
Unix1 servers across the enterprise. There were approximately three hundred to four
hundred Unix servers across four datacenters that were used to host production,
development and test databases, web servers, custom vertical software and other services
for internal business functions.  There are thousands of unique accounts, most of which
exist on multiple systems. Individual user accounts were used by employees to gain
access to the servers as part of their daily job activities. There were also “generic”
accounts that were often shared in some fashion between multiple users or were required
to run certain processes with restricted access. This included privileged accounts like
“oracle” and “root” plus accounts for specific applications, such as “clarify” or “smsdev."
Up until recently, user accounts were maintained by a group of privileged
operators who would login to each machine and create an account with a set of scripts
and/or system commands, depending on the system in question. Because these tools were
not deployed consistently, it was often difficult to determine how best to create accounts
on an individual system.  In addition, the previously existing methods were slow, lacked
                                         
1 Unix is a generic term for a kind of computer operating system (like Windows 95 or Windows NT) which
frequently used on high-end computer platforms (although not exclusively limited to expensive hardware).
One advantage of Unix is that it allows for simultaneous use of computing resources and programs by
multiple users at once.  Cisco uses either Solaris, HP-UX, Linux or PTX Unix operating systems on all
systems that serve data to the entire enterprise, including print, database and mail servers.
2significant features, were somewhat insecure and occasionally corrupted important files
due to poor error checking.  As the organization grew, the need was recognized to
improve the account creation process, and the author took initiative to resolve the
situation.  The end result was a highly flexible script called “mk_accounts” which could
be invoked to create or modify one or more accounts on one or more machines with a
single command.
Literature Review
Substantive literature on Unix account management in a heterogeneous
environment was hard to find.  Presumably this is because it is mainly a technical issue
faced by large corporations and universities, and is not the sort of problem one finds
described in an academic journal. In addition, there are no widely distributed open source
tools to address this issue.  This is probably in part due to the scale of the problem when
it becomes acute, and because environments and requirements vary so greatly between
organizations.  The sort of approach an organization can take depends on how centrally
its technology resources are managed, for example.  Nevertheless, a number of relevant
articles on the subject were found in LISA and USENIX conference proceedings, which
are oriented towards challenges faced in Unix-based environments.
There are several commercial solutions that address at least some of the problems
common to Unix account management in a distributed, heterogeneous environment.  One
solution in common use is NIS, which is supported by most Unix operating systems.  A
white paper from Sun Microsystems, the company that originally developed NIS,
describes it as a system for centralized account management with a single master
3username database, optionally with “slave” servers used for “lookup performance and
reliability” (Sun Microsystems).  Client systems access the NIS user database to
authenticate users attempting to login to the clients. Sun’s white paper is quick to point
out that NIS was developed for relatively small networks where security was not a
concern.  This is because NIS does not encrypt password information passed over the
network during user login authentication or database replication to slave servers.
Responding to concerns such as these, Sun developed a replacement called NIS+.
In addition to a number of significant new features such as hierarchical management of
domains (so that management of large user lists can be performed by different groups),
NIS+ was designed to resolve the security issues inherent to NIS (Sun Microsystems).
Unfortunately, NIS+ is not supported on Unix platforms other than Sun’s Solaris product.
NIS+ can operate in a mode compatible with NIS so that other operating systems can
work with it, but this removed all of the security benefits of using NIS+ in the first place
(Sun Microsystems).  In addition, scalability issues with NIS+ have been noted in large
environments, in particular with performance and availability (Grubb & Carter, 1998).  In
particular, the failover mechanisms for NIS+ are not robust, resulting in incorrect
responses to authentication requests that effectively lock users out of client systems
(Grubb & Carter, 1998).
Many organizations appear to create their own tools that are customized to work
in their particular environments.  For example, after evaluating a number of commercial
alternatives and determining that they were not flexible enough for their needs, James
Madison University created a custom system to manage accounts for its users (Harris &
Gingerich, 1996).  They designed a central database to house account information that
4contained some of the feature improvements of NIS+, then implemented a method of
distributing the information to their servers.  True to expectation, this implementation is
highly customized to meet the particular needs of this organization.  The design decisions
made leave it vulnerable to several security concerns, such as sniffing for password
strings and leaving it rather vulnerable to spoofing (Harris & Gingerich, 1996).  As a
result, it is essentially no more secure than NIS, but did improve upon some of the
administration tasks, according to the authors (Harris & Gingerich, 1996).
Administrators at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory pursued another
approach.  They also created a central database to house enterprise-wide information
about user accounts (Thomas, Schroeder, Orcutt, Johnson, Simmelink & Moore, 1996).
They then created host-based tools that query the central database for information before
performing tasks such as creating an account.  In addition, these tools could update the
central database so it can be queried by other tools to report information on user account
status, hardware configuration, etc. (Thomas et al, 1996).  This would obviously simply
many account management tasks, such as maintaining consistent UID and login name
information across systems, but it is a client “pull” system.  Account creation and
management cannot be invoked from a central location.  The article did not address
security concerns in particular, but presumably this tool does not encrypt network traffic,
so it is subject to the same security concerns as NIS when it passes password information
across the network.
Administrators at the University of Maryland took still another direction (Riddle,
Danckaert & Metaferia, 1995).  A central database was created with entries for all faculty
and staff.  Individual users could then execute a program to request an account.  Twelve
5hours later, the accounts would be distributed to the appropriate systems (Riddle et al,
1995).  An obvious advantage of this approach is that the organization was taking
advantage of the account centralization to reduce the support burden on operators.  Given
proper authentication, users could request accounts and the accounts were later created
without further human intervention.  It is still a pull design – the client polls the central
database every few hours for a list of accounts it should create, but this implementation
largely overcomes the efficiency limitation described in the Pacific Northwest example.
It also takes the process one step further than James Madison University by allowing
users “self-service” operation of the tool.
After reading these case studies, one interesting observation is that none of the
solutions resolved basic security concerns, although most noted security as an issue for
future investigation.  All offered improvements over completely decentralized
management, but some were significantly more robust or efficient that others. Also, all of
these organizations had to start from scratch.  They apparently did not have existing
central databases or a secure communication relationship between hosts, which hampered
the implementation.  As will be described later, the new tool implemented for Cisco
Systems was able to leverage some existing processes that obviated the need to directly
address some of the flaws in the systems just described.
The Problem
As stated earlier, the existing methods for account creation were disparate and had
several serious issues.  Part of the problem was exacerbated by disconnects between
various groups that have privileges to modify accounts.  A central group called the
6“Access Team” handled most account management.  They typically handled new account
requests and account terminations.  A group referred to as “System Administrators”
managed individual hosts and they sometimes fielded account management issues,
especially for special “generic” accounts that often required extra privileges on a host.  In
addition, password reset requests were typically handled by Technical Response Center
(TRC) analysts, who had the authority to alter passwords for most accounts.  Each of
these groups had deployed their own set of scripts that met some or most of their
immediate needs.
The various scripts each had issues that fall into general categories.  Although there
may be some overlap, these are largely described by the following:
· Security
· Reliability
· Efficiency
· Scalability
· Flexibility
From the perspective of security, many of the previously existing methods for
account management were terrible.  Most of the tools did not maintain a central audit
trail, so it was difficult to determine when an account was modified and by which tool.
Some of them relied on direct, manual modification of system files with an editor so it
was completely impossible to determine what was modified.  There was no consistent
method for password generation or synchronization, so typically initial passwords were
arbitrarily set to easily guessed values that were communicated to users via insecure
email.  Also, operators typically performed account creation using telnet2, which is not
                                         
2 Telnet is a protocol for connecting to remote Unix hosts.  Telnet is also typically the name of the program
used to make that connection.  Readers may be more familiar with programs referred to as “web browsers”
that utilize the “http” protocol to connect to remote systems (web servers).  The concepts for remote access
using telnet are the same, although telnet is a text-based medium.
7encrypted over the network.  Therefore, passwords or other secure information could
potentially be leaked to unauthorized individuals.
Reliability was also an extremely serious concern, as the scripts already in place were
vulnerable to error and did not happily co-exist with other processes.  There were several
incidents where simultaneous actions taking place on the same passwd3 file wiped out
user accounts or caused corruption.  Part of this was due to poor programming and
insufficient error checking.  In addition, different groups who had authority to create and
modify accounts were using different tools, some of which were not locking files in the
same manner or at all, so inevitably there were collisions. A couple of such incidents
resulted in downtime on the system in question, as even the root account was corrupted
so no repairs could be made without booting from another source.
In addition, the old tools were not particularly efficient.  For example, to create a
typical account, first the account UID4 had to be determined by looking up the value in an
employee database or on some system where the account already existed.  Next, the
operator logged into the host where the account was to be created.  Then they either
created the account manually or with a host-based script.  If it was done manually, the
operator would type or paste the appropriate entry into the /etc/passwd file, create the
home directory and login files and then run the passwd command to set an initial
password.  If done via one of several different scripts, then the operator would be
prompted to enter in information such as the UID, username, real name, passwd, etc. and
                                         
3 The /etc/passwd file on unix systems contains vital information about each user account, including the
user name and in some cases their encrypted password (on many versions of unix password information is
now kept in a separate file called /etc/shadow for security reasons).
4 Uid is a number that uniquely identifies an account on a unix system.  For example, the most privileged
user (usually called the “root” account) has a uid of “1” although this is totally arbitrary.  If a file has a uid
of “1” then that file is owned by the “root” account.  The mapping of account usernames to uid values is
8then the account would be created.  Only one account could be created at a time, and only
on one system at a time.  To create accounts for personnel who required accounts on all
systems (such as Operations and System Administration personnel) would take an Access
Team operator a few hours.  Alternatively, system administrators would be requested to
create these accounts on the boxes they were primarily responsible for, but this was very
time consuming and inevitably some systems would be missed.
The old tools also had issues in terms of scalability.  Primarily, this was because the
installation process for the older scripts was poorly documented and onerous.  There was
a collection of several scripts and configuration files that needed to be copied into several
different directories.  There was poor version control between hosts and no formal
method of updating older scripts.  Some hosts had no account management scripts
installed at all, and so account management was done on an ad hoc basis.  Because of
these problems, many operators had written their own scripts that worked only on a
specific set of machines that they primarily worked with.  The result was an impressively
disjointed set of scripts that were difficult to deploy to new systems.
Finally, the old methods of account creation suffered in terms of flexibility.  Some of
them could handle creating accounts, while others could also lock accounts.  Separate
scripts allowed operators to perform operations like changing shells or changing
usernames, but these scripts were not consistently deployed.  Most of them were written
with one function in mind, so they took a very minimal set of arguments and were not
written to be very extensible.  Many of them overlapped in functionality.  Some scripts
were designed to run interactively while others were command-line oriented. As a
                                                                                                                   
kept in the /etc/passwd file.  At Cisco Systems, every user has a common uid value across all systems and
is determined when the employee is hired.
9consequence, existing features were difficult to catalog and new features were difficult to
add.
While evaluating potential solutions to this problem, a number of other requirements
were considered.  Of primary concern was that the implementation of the solution be
non-disruptive, if at all possible.  Because of the scale of deployment and the level of
other activity, deploying a solution that would require downtime and extensive
modification of client hosts would be extremely difficult to sell and would greatly
increase the time for deployment.  The more potentially disruptive the solution, the
longer the testing period would have to be.
Furthermore, the solution needed to leverage the existing infrastructure as much as
possible.  This served two purposes.  First, whenever significant changes are made there
is a risk of introducing new support problems.  As long as the existing infrastructure
meets all or most of the requirements, this risk is reduced.  The second purpose served is
frugality.  Increased licensing fees and increased man-hours for deployment and ongoing
support are less likely when the required changes are less dramatic.
Finally, the design and deployment period of the new solution should be relatively
short, measured in weeks or at most 2-3 months.  With Cisco’s rapid growth and
constantly changing environment, the development cycle of new projects has to be very
rapid in order to be useful to the enterprise.
Three competing approaches were identified.  The first was to implement some sort
of centralized form of user authentication, such as NIS or NIS+ (described above).  These
kinds of solutions concentrate account management on a central host or set of hosts.
Client hosts that subscribe to this model communicate with the central account database
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when authenticating user passwords.  IT at Cisco had shied away from these technologies
in the past because of security concerns, lack of need and limited or no support on some
operating systems.  Enterprise-wide solutions using Active Directory and LDAP were
under active investigation, but implementation would be at least a year or two away.
This kind of solution would involve a disruptive implementation process, would not take
advantage of existing infrastructure and would require a long implementation period.
That level of effort was deemed outside the scope of this project unless no other
reasonable alternatives existed.
The second approach was to choose some existing method of account management
and improve upon it.  This would involve standardizing some of the existing scripts and
deploying them everywhere, extending their feature set as needed.  This could be done
within a reasonable time period, would utilize the existing infrastructure and
implementation would be largely non-disruptive, as it would not require downtime on
affected hosts.  To this end, several scripts were evaluated in terms of the security,
availability, scalability and flexibility criteria described earlier.  To expand upon earlier
statements, these criteria were:
· Security.  Use of the tool should be restricted to authorized users, utilize
encryption over the network, and allow passwords to be synchronized with
the users email password rather than only accepting a “temporary”
password that needs to be communicated to the user.
· Availability.  The tool should modify accounts in a safe manner, to avoid
data corruption and possible loss of service.  Standard account
management tools should be used when available (such as standard Unix
operating system commands, including useradd and passwd), and any
direct modification of system files should utilize file locking norms
expected by other processes with legitimate access to those files.  This
would include operating system commands and other “authorized” scripts.
· Efficiency.  The tool should be efficient to use in a rapidly growing
environment.  For example, wherever possible, information should be
gathered automatically rather than prompting operator input.
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· Scalability.  The tool should require minimal effort to deploy to new
systems.  The best case scenario would require no special configuration on
the client end, or at least piggyback on configurations required for other
purposes.
· Flexibility.  The tool should be comprehensive enough to be used for all
expected account management needs, and be easily extensible for future
required features.
It was determined that the tools could be modified to satisfy most of these criteria to
some degree.  Availability targets could be achieved by ensuring that a consistent method
of file locking was used and by implementing error correction routines to safeguard
existing data. Most scalability targets were also achievable, since the scripts could be
distributed automatically by pushing a standard version out periodically and by including
them in the standard build process for new hosts.  Given a through re-write, flexibility
requirements could largely be met by merging functions from various scripts.
Security requirements were a tougher issue.  Without a significant education effort, it
could prove difficult to ensure that use of the tool was performed in a secure manner,
such as using SSH5 when using the tool.  This is because for other legitimate reasons,
telnet traffic was allowed on most hosts and there is no easy way to force certain users to
connect only via a secure protocol.  In addition, for the sake of efficiency and security, it
would be useful for the account management tool to be able to capture the encrypted
password string for a user from their email server and insert it on the client host.  Thus
the user would know the “new” password without requiring the use of any insecure
notification method, such as an unencrypted email.  However, it would be inadvisable to
grant every Unix host the access to read passwords from all of IT mail servers because
additional trust relationships between hosts would have to be introduced.  This increases
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the potential for compromise.  Hosts that are trusted by client systems should be heavily
secured, such as only allowing access via encrypted protocols and limiting access to a
very small number of users.  By their very nature, general production systems cannot be
so secured because regular users require access to them.
In addition, the primary efficiency concern would not be met by revamping the
existing tools.  Operators would still have to login to individual hosts and execute the
scripts locally, which can take a significant amount of time and requires that all operators
have access to all machines.6  Clearly a compromise between centralized account
management and a host-based tool was required.
The Solution
The solution was to implement what essentially amounts to a wrapper script that
can be run from a centralized location that has secure access to other IT servers.  This
wrapper script accepts arguments that are passed on to client-side script, which performs
the requested operations.
Of course, this solution has a few dependencies.  First, it required a central host or
hosts which have some sort of access to other servers within the IT organization.  The
nature of the relationship is unimportant – it could require a password to be entered at
execution that is cached in memory and fed to client systems as necessary.  The protocol
                                                                                                                   
5 SSH refers to a protocol called Secure Shell, which is like telnet in that it allows for remote access to a
unix host.  Unlike telnet, however, SSH network traffic is encrypted so it would be extremely difficult for
unauthorized individuals to spy on the traffic.
6 Cisco security policy dictates that there be no direct login to “generic” accounts because of the lack of an
audit trail.  Therefore relying upon a single “account management” account would be out of the question.
As a consequence, all operators that require the ability to manage accounts would require logins on all
hosts.
13
used could be encrypted or not.  What is important is that the relationship exists and that
it can be utilized without excessive hardship on the part of operators using the account
management tool.  Fortunately, this access infrastructure was already in place at Cisco for
other purposes.
Second, the scripts require a common run-time environment on every client host,
which can be used to execute the client-side script.  Both the wrapper and client-side
scripts were written in Perl 5, which is always installed in a common location on all IT
Unix hosts.  If Perl 5 is not detected on the client host for some reason, an error message
is returned to the operator for investigation.
Third, the client-side script must be able to execute on relevant operating systems.
The script currently works on Solaris and HP-UX systems, which make up the bulk of
Unix servers managed by IT at Cisco Systems.  Linux is used only for print servers,
which do not require any appreciable account management effort, and only a few systems
use PTX.7  There were already existing account management tools for the Linux and PTX
systems in use with IT that seem to work well.  The tool could be expanded to cover
these or other operating systems if required.
The wrapper script was designed to accept a variety of arguments at once so that
account management operations could be performed on multiple systems at a time.  A
detailed listing of available options is presented in Appendix A, while a portion of the
code used to process the arguments can be found in Appendix B. The default mode is for
account creation.  Arguments accepted include a list of hosts, a list of account names, and
the preferred shell.  First each username submitted is looked up in the employee database
to determine the user’s real name and UID value.  This database was pre-existing and is
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maintained by another organization.  Authorized generic accounts are also listed in the
database, so it is a canonical source of UID information.  If the account is for an
employee, the employee’s active employment status is automatically verified before an
account will be created.  No previous account management tool deployed at Cisco
performed these operations automatically.  An example of an account creation command
would be:
# /usr/local/bin/mk_accounts -u user1 user2 user3 -h host1 host2 -s /bin/ksh
This would create an account for the users user1, user2 and user3 on the servers host1
and host2 and set the user’s login shell to /bin/ksh.
The next step performed after an account creation command is executed is to try
to determine a password to assign to the account.  If the account is generic, the password
is automatically locked, ensuring that it is only accessed via other means.8  If t  account
is a regular user, the wrapper script first attempts to determine the user’s email server.9  If
it is able to determine the user’s email server and that server is accessible, the script
retrieves the encrypted password string from the email server.  This string can be fed to
the client-side script to synchronize the password with the user’s email server password,
without ever having to decrypt it.  This is a very secure method of setting passwords
because the operator never knows the user’s password, nor does the operator or program
ever have to communicate the password in clear text where it could possibly be
intercepted.  On occasion, a mail server is inaccessible and thus the password cannot be
                                                                                                                   
7 This is the operating system used by IBM’s NUMA-Q hardware.
8 Typically this is through the use of a tool called “sudo.”  Sudo allows a regular account to exercise extra
privileges on the basis of an access control list.  A user is granted access to generic accounts using this tool
because it provides an audit trail.
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determined.  For example, the email server may not be owned by IT or the user’s email
server may be indeterminate.  In this case the wrapper script would attempt to retrieve the
user’s intranet web password by accessing a locally replicated version of the intranet
password file10.  If that fails, the user account is locked and the password will have to be
set manually by an operator.  This always occurs when the user’s email account is
initially setup, as it is their first Unix account.  However, existing “new hire” processes
are used to securely communicate the user’s initial password in that case.
Options exist to override the default order of behavior.  For example, the
argument “-web” will cause the wrapper to synchronize the account’s password on
specified servers with the intranet password only, thus ignoring email server
synchronization.  The argument “-e <encrypted string>” allows the operator to set the
password to an arbitrary encrypted string.  This feature allows other scripts to invoke the
wrapper script to set the encrypted string to some specific value.  A future application of
this might be a web page that would prompt a user to enter a new password, then invokes
the wrapper script to distribute the new password to a list of specified hosts.  This web
page would collect a new password for an account and store it in the standard 13
character Unix encrypted format.  Then a batch process could invoke the mk_accounts
script to push the password out to all (or just some) hosts with a command like:
# /usr/local/bin/mk_accounts -u user1 –e “GWE8U0xymPL2S” –all
                                                                                                                   
9 This is performed using the command “/usr/lib/sendmail –bv username” which will return the name of the
user’s email server if the account is addressable as username@cisco.com.
10 The intranet password file is standard across the entire company.  It is pushed out several times a day to
all intranet web servers from a central source.
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The wrapper script also accepts a number of other special arguments.  The
argument “-admin” will build a default list of accounts for creation.  It does this by
scanning a master file11 that contains the names of users that should exist on every
system, such as system and database administrators.  The argument “-all” will add to the
host list all known12 IT hosts.  The argument “-lock” will lock all listed accounts on all
listed hosts, rather than create the account, by locking the password and changing the
account shell to “/bin/false.”  The argument “-unterm” will reverse a “-lock” operation.
In order to do its work, the wrapper script collects all of this information and then
passes it on to a client script on each specified host.  If the client script is not already
installed, then it is pushed to the client before being executed.  Other dependencies (such
as the operating system type and the presence of Perl 5) are also checked, so that the
script can offer meaningful error messages if it is not able to complete its task.  One
advantage of this approach is that the script can successfully run on hosts even if it was
not previously known as an IT-accessible host (such as a test box or user workstation that
happens to meet the requirements of the three dependencies mentioned above).  This
greatly improves the scalability of the script.  Because all use of the mk_accounts script is
logged to files not accessible to typical operators, a clear audit trail is maintained so
account problems resulting from its use can be tracked.
A client-side script is invoked to perform the actual work on each server.  It
accepts a subset of the arguments available to the wrapper script (arguments such as “-h
host1” and “-web” are not applicable).  To set a password, the client-side script is simply
passed an encrypted value – the client-side script does not care how this value was
                                         
11 This master list of administrative accounts is pre-existing, and is maintain by other processes.
12 This master list of hosts is pre-existing, and is maintain by other processes.
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generated, as long as it is valid.  If the client-side script is asked to create accounts, it first
iterates through the user list creating accounts with a standard operating system-provided
command.13  This command locks the /etc/passwd file during use so that it will not run
into problems with other programs which respect the lock.  Although these can be
overridden, the client-side script is setup with certain defaults for user shell, home
directory location and G ID14.  These values can be overridden on a per host basis,
because the client script checks for the presence of a configuration file in /etc whose
format was borrowed from another existing Cisco tool for account management.  Many
of these values can also be overridden on a per user basis if so specified in the arguments.
Where there is conflict between the default values for account attributes, the order of
precedence from highest is lowest is:  Specified command line arguments, then /etc
configuration file defaults, then built-in script defaults, then operating system defaults.
To insert the actual encrypted password value, the program first locks the
/etc/passwd file (and if present, the /etc/shadow file) using the same method as typical
operating system commands like useradd and passwd.  The script then iterates through
the file until it finds the appropriate record, replaces the encrypted string in a temporary
file and then performs some error checking.  For example, if there is a significant size
difference between the original and the temporary file, the program assumes that there
has been some sort of corruption and aborts the operation.  Once complete, the program
moves the temporary file into place, removing the lock file.  This is the same method
                                         
13 On Solaris and HP-UX systems, the command used is “useradd.”  This command accepts arguments for
all parts of account creation (such as username and default shell) except for the actual user password.
14 This value is similar to the previously described UID.  GID identifies which “group” of users an account
belongs to.  Access to certain files can be restricted by user, group or everyone.  The mapping of GID
values to group names is kept in /etc/group.
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used by the built-in “passwd” command of most Unix operating systems.  A portion of
the code used to perform this operation can be found in Appendix C.
Conclusion
As previously stated, before deployment of the mk_accounts tool at Cisco, Unix
account creation was a largely ad hoc process that was fraught with problems.  The
previous tools were subject to security and reliability issues.  The feature set required by
operators was inconsistently implemented or not available at all, and their design was not
flexible enough to quickly add required features.  Because of where the scripts were
located and the manual input of UID and other information required, they were inefficient
to run when working with large numbers of accounts or systems.  Scalability was a
concern because there was no easy method of installing the scripts on new servers.
Considering Cisco’s growth, the lack of efficiency was also a scalability issue, because
even though the IT organization was also growing in head count, it could not expand at
the same pace as server and user growth.  In order to scale support for the ever-expanding
environment, IT had to become more efficient.
The mk_accounts script remedied all of these issues.  The implementation of the
mk_accounts was non-disruptive, which made the new system easy to justify putting into
immediate production.  It required no new infrastructure or modification of existing
processes, outside of the removal of the old tools and minor training to enable operators
to use the new tool.  The design and deployment period of mk_accounts was rapid,
allowing IT to quickly resolve a pressing situation and move on to other tasks.
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In addition, mk_accounts satisfies all of the design criteria set forth at start of the
project.  Because it synchronizes new accounts with existing passwords in most cases,
only the user knows her individual password.  It takes advantage of an existing encrypted
network infrastructure, and all use of the tool is logged for accountability purposes.
Availability goals are met by reducing the chance of human error by removing manual
operations and through the use of file locking and improved error checking when
modifying system files.  By automating much of the information gathering required to
setup an account and allowing for execution on multiple hosts at once, mk_accounts is
much more efficient than older methods.  Its self-install capabilities and improved
efficiency also meets scalability goals.  Finally, the feature set, modular design and
centralized installation allow for easy addition and deployment of new features.  The
entire tool consists of two 500 line scripts, one of which self-replicates to client hosts as
needed.
There is some room for improvement.  For example, username and host lists
submitted within the same command are executed in serial fashion rather than threaded,
so an operation like “mk_accounts –all –admin” can take a significant period of time to
execute.  However, code for threaded execution of Perl scripts has already been written
and deployed at Cisco, and modifying that code to work with mk_accounts will be fairly
easy.  Also, the script does not currently handle changing some account attributes such as
group id or username (for example), but such enhancements can be added to the existing
scripts as required without disrupting existing capabilities.
Despite these shortcomings, the mk_accounts tool meets all of the initial design
requirements without introducing additional liabilities.  It was cheap to develop and
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deploy (development time was the work of one person on a part time basis over
approximately two months).  Furthermore, it works – this code is currently in production
and working without a single negative incident. Some improvement on the old tools
would have been possible, but that approach would not have brought all the advantages
of the new implementation. The mk_accounts program is more secure, more reliable,
more efficient, more scalable and more flexible than the original tools, and thus is a
practical and useful improvement over previous methods of Unix account management at
Cisco Systems.
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Appendix A:  Man Page for the mk_accounts Script
This is a man page for the mk_accounts script, describing available options.
Usage: mk_accounts [cmd_type] [-h host | -all] [-u user | -admin] [options]
Command Type:
-create Create new accounts.  Do not change data for existing accounts
(this is the default, and thus optional).
-sync Sync password with password on mail host.  Will not create new
accounts.
-lock Locks the account(s).
-web update password (only) from the web account.  Will not
create new accounts.  Will force passwd change at first
login.
-change Changes "options" for existing account.  Will not create an
account if it doesn’t exist!
Host List:
-h host Perform action on named host.  Can name more than one:
-h hostname1 hostname2 hostname3...
-all Perform action on all dev and prod servers listed in
/sec/ishosts *EXCEPT* for mail hosts.
User List:
-u user Perform action on these users.  Can name more than one:
-u user1 user2 user3...
-admin Creates accounts for all OPS, SYSADMIN and DBA users, as
specified in the master sudoers file.
-n "passwd" Specify entire / etc/passwd entry to prevent mail host
lookup.  Example:
-n "test:q\hysifRs/D3X:998:1:Test:/users/test:/bin/ksh"
Options:
-s <shell> Override shell specified on user's mail host.  Example:
-s "/bin/ksh"
-forcechange force user to change their password at first login
-v Verbose output
-home <path> override default location for home directory (typically /users)
-e <string> Specify encrypted password string for an account
-test test if user exists on host.  If not, email user that account
modification failed because the account did not exist.  The
default is to fail silently
-unterm restore the users shell and password to the default set on
their primary email server
Examples:
To change the login shell for the “newuser” account on the host “viper”:
mk_accounts -change -h viper -u newuser -s "/bin/ksh"
To create admin accounts on all hosts with shell /bin/ksh:
mk_accounts -create -all -admin -s "/bin/ksh"
which is the same as:
mk_accounts -all -admin -s "/bin/ksh"
To lock the account “user1” on all servers:
mk_accounts -all –u user1 -lock
Other examples:
mk_accounts -h newhost -admin
mk_accounts -h viper -u newuser
mk_accounts –h viper -n "test:q\hysifRs/D3X:998:1:Test:/users/test:/bin/ksh"
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Appendix B:  Argument Parsing Code for mk_accounts Script
This portion of code is used to process arguments fed to the mk_accounts script.  It
processes the arguments in serial fashion, changing state as needed.  For example, when
it encounters an argument called “-h” it changes state so that it knows all following items
listed on the command line are host names, until it encounters some other recognized
argument that begins with a “-”.  “Elsif” commands are used so that as soon as the script
figures out what to do with the argument, it moves on to the next one.
foreach $arg (@ARGV) {
  if ($arg eq "-all") { #build a list of known IT host names
    $all="true";
    @ishosts = `/bin/cat <path to list of IT hosts>`;
  } elsif ($arg eq "-v") { #verbose output when running script
    $verbose="true";
  } elsif ($arg eq "-home") { #override default location for home directory
    $arg_type = "home";
  } elsif ($arg eq "-h") { #list of hosts to create or modify accounts on
    $arg_type = "hosts";
  } elsif ($arg eq "-u") { #list of users to modify
    $arg_type = "users";
  } elsif ($arg eq "-n") {
    #submit an entire /etc/password entry to be passed on to the client script
    # shadow files on the client host will be used for the password if present
    $arg_type = "entry";
    $userinfo_was_called = "true";
  } elsif ($arg eq "-s") { #override default shell for user
    $arg_type = "shell";
  } elsif ($arg eq "-e") { #specify the encrypted password string
    $arg_type = "hash";
    $cmd_type = "hash";
    $mail_lookup = "false";
  } elsif ($arg eq "-change") { #alter existing accounts
$cmd_type = "change";
  } elsif ($arg eq "-create") { #only create new accounts, don't alter existing ones
$cmd_type = "create";
  } elsif ($arg eq "-test") {
$test="true";
        $additional_args = $additional_args . " -test";
  } elsif ($arg eq "-web") { #sync passwd with intranet password
$cmd_type = "web";
$mail_lookup = "false";
  } elsif ($arg eq "-unterm") { #unterminate a locked account
$cmd_type = "unterm";
  } elsif ($arg eq "-sync") { #sync the password with email or intranet password
$cmd_type = "sync";
  } elsif ($arg eq "-lock") { #lock the account(s)
$cmd_type = "lock";
$eman_lookup = "false";
$mail_lookup = "false";
  } elsif ($arg eq "-admin") { #build a list if admin users to create on a host
    @sudoers = `/sec/passwd/parse_sudoers <list of sudo user groups granted admin
privileges>`;
    foreach $sudoer (@sudoers) { #remove line breaks
      chop $sudoer;
      push (@users,$sudoer);
    }
  } elsif ($arg_type eq "hosts") {
24
    push (@hosts,$arg);
    $test = `/bin/grep $arg <path to list of IT hosts>`;
if ($test eq "") { #print warning that the host listed is
#not known to work with the script
  print "$arg is not a known CORE IT host, so the account creation may fail.\n";
}
  } elsif ($arg_type eq "home") {
    $additional_args = $additional_args . " -home $arg";
  } elsif ($arg_type eq "users") {
    push (@users,$arg);
  } elsif ($arg_type eq "entry") {
    push (@userinfo,$arg);
  } elsif ($arg_type eq "shell") {
    $additional_args = $additional_args . " -s $arg";
  } elsif ($arg_type eq "hash") {
    $hash = $arg;
  }
}
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Appendix C:  Passwd Insertion Code for mk_accounts Script
This snippet of code is used by the mk_accounts_client script to process the /etc/passwd
or /etc/shadow file and insert an encrypted password string.
#set the new passwd (hold your breath!)
# what this does is to lock the passwd and shadow files,
# write everything to a temp file and then perform some error checking.
# programs like /bin/passwd will respect the lockfile.  Others may not
# be so nice
sub setpw {
# get arguments
my($new_login,$new_passwd,$override)=@_;
#Other local variables
my($locked,$shadowing);
my($login,$passwd,$uid,$gid,$gcos,$home,$shell);
my($dev,$ino,$omode,$nli nk,$rdev,$osize,$nmode,$nsize);
my($mod_time)=`date +%Y%m%d_%H%M%S`;
chop($mod_time);
if (-f '/etc/ptmp') {
print "Password file busy--waiting up to 2 minutes...\n";
for ($i = 120; $i > 0; --$i) {
sleep(1);
print $i,'...';
last unless -f '/etc/ptmp';
}
}
die "\n/etc/passwd file busy--try again later.\n" if -f '/etc/ptmp';
# Create the lock using link() for atomicity
open(PTMP,">/etc/ptmptmp$$")
|| die "Can't create tmp passwd ptmptmp$$  file.\n";
close PTMP;
$locked = link("/etc /ptmptmp$$",'/etc/ptmp');
unlink "/etc/ptmptmp$$";
$locked || die "/etc/passwd file busy--try again later.\n";
open(PASSWD,"/etc/passwd") || die "Can't open passwd file.\n";
open(PTMP,">/etc/ptmp") || die "Can't copy passwd file.\n";
# Now build new  passwd file
$shadowing = 0;
while (<PASSWD>) {
chop;
($login,$passwd,$uid,$gid,$gcos,$home,$shell) = split(/:/);
# next if $login eq '';  # delete blank lines in passwd file
if ($login eq $new_login) { # change the info
if ($passwd eq 'x ' && -f '/etc/shadow') {
# Check for shadow password file
$shadowing = 1;
# only change pw if it is unset ("*") or $override = "true"
} elsif ( ($passwd eq "*") || ($override eq "true") ) {
$passwd = $new_passwd; #replace gcos with new info
}
if (($config{"HOME"} ne "") && ($modify_base eq "yes")){
$home = "/users/$login";
}
}
print PTMP "$login:$passwd:$uid:$gid:$gcos:$home:$shell\n"
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|| do {unlink '/etc/ptmp'; die "Can't write ptmp: $!"; };
}
close PASSWD;
close PTMP;
# Corruption is bad!
($dev,$ino,$omode,$nlink,$uid,$gid,$rdev,$osize)
= stat('/etc/passwd');
($dev,$ino,$nmode,$nlink,$uid,$gid,$rdev,$nsize)
= stat('/etc/ptmp');
if ($nsize < $osize - 20 || $uid) {
unlink '/etc/ptmp'; # whack that mole!
die  "Can't write new passwd file! ($uid)\n";
}
chmod 0644, '/etc/ptmp';
if ($shadowing) {
open(SHADOW,"/etc/shadow") || die "Can't open shadow file.\n";
umask 077;
open(STMP,">/etc/stmp") || die "Can't copy shadow file.\n";
while (<SHADOW>) {
$user = $_;
chop;
@fields = split(/:/);
$colons = 7 - $#fields;
if ( ( ($fields[0] eq $new_login) && ($fields[1] =~ /\*LK\*/ ) ) ||
     ( ($fields[0] eq $new_login) && ($override eq "true" ) )
   ) {
$fields[1] = $new_passwd;
$f ields[2] = int(time / 86400);
#print STMP join(':',@fields,':::::'), "\n";
print STMP join(':',@fields);
while ($colons > 0) {
print STMP ":";
$colons--;
}
print STMP "\n";
} else {
print STMP $user;
}
}
close SH ADOW;
close STMP;
($dev,$ino,$omode,$nlink,$uid,$gid,$rdev,$osize)
= stat('/etc/shadow');
($dev,$ino,$nmode,$nlink,$uid,$gid,$rdev,$nsize)
= stat('/etc/stmp');
if ($nsize < $osize - 20 || $uid) {
die "Can't write new shadow file! ($uid)\n ";
}
chmod 0600, '/etc/shadow';
#rename('/etc/shadow','/etc/passwd_backups/shadow.' . $mod_time);
rename('/etc/shadow','/etc/passwd_backups/shadow');
chmod 0600, '/etc/stmp';
rename('/etc/stmp','/etc/shadow');
}
# Release lock by renaming p tmp.
#rename('/etc/passwd','/etc/passwd_backups/passwd.' . $mod_time);
rename('/etc/passwd','/etc/passwd_backups/passwd');
rename('/etc/ptmp','/etc/passwd')
|| die "Couldn't install new passwd file: $!\n";
$err1 = `/bin/passwd -x 182 $login`;
print  $err1;
}
